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trustee, however, refused to recognize the proposed amendment, contending
that the child en ventre sa tmnre was a "person beneficially interested" under
Section 23, and thus the child's consent was needed to amend. The Court, at
Special Term, held that such consent was not required, and the Appellate
Division unanimously affirmed, as did the Court of Appeals.
The Court's rationale lay in the trend in recent years to favor the
revocability of trusts. 26 Such a policy would certainly be frustrated if revoca-
tion were made to depend upon the consent of persons yet unborn. To hold
otherwise would force a determination as to whether a female settlor was preg-
nant at the time of amendment, and since no absolute determination can be
made, future litigation is invited.
The Court further considered the intention of the legislature in drafting
Section 23, and pointed out that the legislature has certainly recognized the
possibility of such an occurrence as exists in the present case, and has provided
for unborn children where policy so dictates.27
It has consistently been held that a child yet unborn is not a "person
beneficially interested" under Section 23.28 These cases, however, referred to
situations where the unborn child was conceived and born after the amendment
was executed. The present case is the first to reach the Court of Appeals where
there existed a child en ventre sa mare at the time the amendment was executed.
One lower court decision has held that the fiction of the law which affixes a
legal personality to an unborn child,2 9 should not be extended to cases of trust
revocation.30
A line must be drawn somewhere and the courts generally do so at the
time of birth. With no accurate method available to ascertain the exact time
of conception, to extend the principle further can only result in chaotic
disturbances to the judicial system.
JUDIcIAL ExCISION OF MEASURING IFE "nO TRUST TO Avonm RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES
Until the recent amendment of the New York Personal Property Law
Section 11,31 the alienation of personal property interests in New York State
could not be restrained for a period greater than that measured by two lives
in being at the time of a gift, the testator's death, or the establishment of a
26. Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. (1951) at 85.
27. Section 26 of the New York Decedent Estate Law provides that where a testator
shall have a child born after the making of a last will, the child, if not mentioned, shall
succeed to the same portion of such parent's real and personal estate as would have
descended to the child had such parent died intestate; Section 83(12) of the New York
Decedent Estate Law gives similar protection to after-born descendants and other dis-
tributees of the deceased; so also Section 56 of the Real Property Law provides protection
for posthumous children capable of taking by descent.
28. Smith v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 287 N.Y. 500, 41 N.E.2d 72 (1942);
County Trust Co. v. Young, 287 N.Y. 801, 40 N.E.2d 1019 (1942).
29. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
30. In re Wormser's Trust, 15 Misc. 2d 754, 185 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
31. N.Y. SEss. LAws 1958, ch. 152, effective Sept. 1, 1958.
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trust.3 2 New York courts have utilized numerous devices to ameliorate the
harshness of this rule.33 Among these devices is excision of portions of the
instrument in question which are violative of the rule, but not essential to the
settlor's purpose.
In In re Philipson's Trust3 4 the Court of Appeals, by a 4-3 memorandum
decision, upheld the excision of a measuring life of a trust and thus upheld the
trust. Settlor upon divorce from his first wife established a trust for her
benefit and the benefit of his six year old son and three year old twins. The
duration of the trust was measured by the wife's life and that of the survivor of
the twins. The Appellate Division excised the wife's life as a measuring life,
and upheld the remainder of the trust on the theory that the trust was for
the benefit of the family unit and the possibility that the wife would survive
both of the twins was remote.35 Therefore, they held that the wife's life could
be excised without defeating the settlor's dominant purpose. The dissenting
minority in the Court of Appeals reasoned that the wife's life as a measuring
standard was an essential part of the trust and that the Court was legislating
retrospectively where the legislature had seen fit only to do so prospectively. 36
The problem which this case places in focus is one of how far the courts
will go in sustaining a trust which on its face violates the rule against perpe-
tuities. It has been held that a trust violative of the rule which is severable
into subordinate trusts which do not violate the rule may be severed and the
separate trusts upheld.3 7 In addition the courts have excised invalid provisions
and upheld the remaining valid provisions if the dominant purpose of the trust
is not affected by so doing.38 Here, however, the trust duration is measured
by specified lives, not the lives of all of the beneficiaries, and the defect cannot
be cured by severing certain interests. Neither can any separate provision be
eliminated and the trust upheld. The measuring standard must be re-drafted
by the Court if the trust is to stand. If this is done a substantive change is
effected in the rights of one of the beneficiaries. The Appellate Division, and
apparently the majority in the Court of Appeals, rested their decisions to excise
the wife's life on the latitude suggested in In re Durand's Wil13 concerning
the effectuation of the settlor's or testator's dominant purpose.40 In that case,
however, the Court excised a severable invalid provision and not words from a
single controlling provision as is done in the present case. The holding there
does not seem to support the Court's excision in the instant case.
32. N.Y. PERS. PRop. LAW § 11.
33. See RFSTATENr, PROPERTy, app. §§ 47-59 (1944) for a discussion of the devices
so used.
34. 5 N.Y.2d 920, 183 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1959).
35. 4 A.D.2d 245, 164 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1st Dep't 1957).
36. In re Philipson's Trust, supra note 34 at 924, 183 N.Y.S.2d 284.
37. Corse v. Chapman, 153 N.Y. 466, 47 N.E. 812 (1897); In re Homer's Will, 237
N.Y. 489, 143 N.E. 665 (1924); see also Kahn v. Tierney, 135 App. Div. 897, 120 N.Y.
Supp. 663, aff'd 201 N.Y. 516, 94 N.E. 1095 (1911).
38. In re Durand's Will, 250 N.Y. 45, 164 N.E. 737 (1928).
39. Id. at 53, 54, 164, N.E. 740.
40. In re Philipson's Trust, supra note 35 at 248, 164 N.Y.S.2d 382.
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The effect of this case on the substantive law of future interests is
eliminated concerning future dispositions by the recent amendment to the
Personal Property Law.41 The case does stand, however, as an example of the
lengths to which the Court will go in upholding trusts which apparently violate
the rule against perpetuities.
DETERMINATION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE
Undue influence in the execution of wills is a concept that does not lend
itself to any precise definition. Generally the courts regard it as something
that amounts to a destruction of free agency.42 Thus, it presents a subjective
question in each case, 43 which seldom, if ever, is capable of proof by direct
evidence. This being true, it is generally recognized in New York, as well as
other jurisdictions, that undue influence may be proved by circumstantial evi-
dence.44 Therefore, under our jury system, the question that usually faces
appellate courts is whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of
undue influence.
This precise question was before the Court in In re Walther's Will.45
Here, the testatrix was an elderly spinster who became afflicted with senile
psychosis several years prior to her death. She was declared incompetent and
her sister, the proponent and chief beneficiary of her will, was appointed com-
mittee. During this period the testatrix was removed from her apartment and
spent her last days in her sister's home except for several intervals of confine-
ment to a nursing sanitarium. Sixteen months prior to her death she executed a
will to which a nephew objected on probate on the ground that it was the
product of undue influence exercised by the sister. The Appellate Division
affirmed the jury finding of undue influence,46 and the Court of Appeals (5-2)
reversed and remanded for probate.47
The majority, in holding that there was insufficient evidence to sustain
the jury finding, placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the bene-
ficiary was not the unnatural object of the testatrix's bounty. It pointed out
that the sister was probably her most intimate companion while the contestant
was an inattentive nephew.
The majority was aided in their finding of insufficiency of evidence by
two rules of evidence followed by New York courts. The first of these is that
in an allegation of undue influence the burden of proof is upon the party who
41. Supra note 31.
42. Children's Aid Society of City of New York v. Loveridge, 70 N.Y. 387 (1877);
Rollwagen v. Rollwagen, 63 N.Y. 504 (1875); Smith v. Keller, 205 N.Y. 39, 98 N.E. 214
(1912).
43. ATrxisoN, HANDBOOx ON THE LAW or VILLS § 55 (2d ed. 1953).
44. In re Dowdle, 224 App. Div. 450, 231 N.Y. Supp. 320 (4th Dep't 1928), aff'd
256 N.Y. 629, 177 N.E. 169 (1931).
45. 6 N.Y.2d 49, 188 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1959).
46. 6 A.D.2d 858, 175 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (4th Dep't 1958).
47. Supra note 45.
